| 摘要Abstract | ：本研究之目的為探討會計盈餘及時性 (the timeliness of accounting earnings) 對公司治理結構之影響。董事與外部投資人欲監督公司與經理人 之績效，需要會計資訊來瞭解公司權益價值的改變。本文提出假說預期：當 本期會計數字相對上較無法捕捉公司當期全部之價值攸關資訊時，財務會計 系統較無法滿足董事與股東的治理需求，盈餘的監督功能 (stewardship function) 因而降低。此時，公司的治理結構特徵將偏向那些能夠協助董事與 股東進行高成本監督活動的董事會與所有權結構，俾補充盈餘監督價值之不 足。本研究以上市公司為研究對象，藉由檢視盈餘及時性代理變數與隨後之 公司治理結構特徵之橫斷面相關性，來探討公司治理結構是否隨盈餘及時性 而改變。實證結果發現，會計盈餘及時性相對較低的公司，其內部董事的權 益誘因、董事及經理人整體權益誘因及外部股東權益誘因皆較高。整體而 言，此實證證據支持本研究假說之預期，即公司財務會計資訊的特性亦為公 司治理結構的決定因素之一。This study investigates how corporate governance structures vary with the timeliness of accounting earnings using a sample of Taiwanese listed firms. In order to monitor managers’performance, directors and outside investors need accounting information to evaluate changes in firm value. Accounting earnings are less effective in the governance processes when current accounting numbers do a relatively poor job of capturing the effects of the firm’s current activities and outcomes on shareholder value. The hypotheses developed in this study predict that for firms with relatively uninformative earnings, the characteristics of their board and ownership structures will be those that assist costly monitoring activities by directors and shareholders to make up for the inadequacy of earnings. The research design of this study aims at examining the cross-sectional relation between proxies for earnings timeliness and subsequent corporate governance structures after controlling for other firm characteristics that are related to corporate governance. Consistent with the predictions of the proposed hypotheses, the results show that there is a significant negative relation between the timeliness of earnings and the equity-based incentives of inside directors, the equity-based incentives of all officers and directors, and the equity-based incentives of outside shareholders respectively. This study identifies the timeliness of a firm’s accounting earnings as an additional important determinant of governance structures. |