| 摘要Abstract | 本研究旨在探討不同的董監薪酬揭露方式及揭露金額是否會影響公司使用裁決性應計數及實質盈餘管理之程度。首先，觀察2006年及2007年強制揭露前，自願性個別揭露及彙總揭露之差異，探討董監事薪酬揭露愈透明是否會抑制管理階層操縱盈餘，再者以2008年至2018年強制揭露法規制定後，若皆在個別揭露下，相較於自願性揭露，依法強制揭露董監薪酬之公司，是否會有不同之盈餘管理程度。實證結果發現，強制規範制定前，相較於彙總揭露之公司，自願性個別揭露之公司，傾向使用向下之裁決性應計數，且當揭露金額愈大時，自願性個別揭露之公司也較不會透過過度生產之方式進行實質盈餘管理。此外，也發現相較於自願性個別揭露，2008年至2018年強制性個別揭露之公司，較會執行盈餘向上之裁決性應計數及透過放寬信用條件之方式管理盈餘，而較不會刪減裁決性費用，惟當揭露董監事之薪酬金額愈大時，由於裁決性應計數較易被察覺，公司反而傾向選擇透過過度生產之方式來管理盈餘。希冀透過本文實證結果，能提供董監事薪酬揭露規範之政策，是否影響企業管理盈餘之證據，以提供主管機關及企業利害關係人對於董監事薪酬揭露之方式及金額，對企業造成影響之判斷依據。The purpose of this study is to explore whether different disclosure methods and amounts of director and supervisor compensation affect the extent to which companies use discretionary accruals and real earnings management. First, we observe the differences between voluntary individual disclosures and aggregate disclosures before mandatory disclosures in 2006 and 2007, and explore whether more transparent disclosure of director and supervisor compensation inhibits managerial manipulation of earnings. Then we explore whether companies that legally complied with mandatory disclosure regulations for director and supervisor compensation following enactment of mandatory disclosure regulations between 2008 and 2018 had a different degree of earnings management compared to those with voluntary disclosures if all disclosures were individual. The empirical results found that before the enactment of mandatory disclosure regulations, companies with voluntary individual disclosures tended to use downward discretionary accruals compared to companies with aggregate disclosures. And when the disclosure amount was higher, the voluntary individual disclosed company is also less likely to conduct real earnings management through overproduction. In addition, we also found that, compared to companies with voluntary individual disclosures, companies with mandatory individual disclosures from 2008 to 2018 were more likely to implement discretionary accruals of upward earnings management and earnings management via relaxed credit requirements, and less likely to cut back on discretionary expenditures. Only when higher director and supervisor compensation was disclosed due to discretionary accruals being easier to detect, did the company tend to choose overproduction to manage earnings that was packaged with real transactions and less easily audited. We hope that the empirical results of this study can provide evidence on whether director and supervisor compensation disclosure regulation policies affect corporate management earnings, as well as provide authorities and business stakeholders a basis against which director and supervisor compensation disclosure methods, their value, and their impact on the company can be determined. |